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This paper investigates how the introduction of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, the European Union’s implementation of harmonized banking
supervision, has affected the banking sector in Europe. I perform an event
study on banks’ stock returns and find evidence for small but significant
positive effects. A potential hypothesis for this result is the fact that a single
supervisory authority can take spillover effects between countries into account
and is therefore able to stabilize the European banking sector. Splitting the
sample by an indicator for supervisory power, an indicator for corruption
and by Debt/GDP reveals that the positive impact of the SSM was stronger
for banks in countries that perform poorly with respect to these measures.
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1 Introduction
Since November 2014, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) monitors
large banks in the euro area. It replaces national authorities to ensure
harmonized supervision of significant financial institutions. Resulting from
the financial crisis, the SSM was founded as part of the European banking
union, Europe’s response to an unstable financial sector. In particular, the
SSM is supposed to put an end to the negative feedback loop between
government debt and bank bailout.1 In order to accomplish this purpose,
banks must be monitored by an institution that aligns the interests of all
countries in the euro area. For this reason, the European Central Bank (ECB)
was designated as executive institution of the SSM. The political objective
of the SSM is clearly stated. The underlying mechanisms and their impact
on banks, however, are more ambiguous.
There can be various ways in which the SSM influences the financial sector
and thus the profitability of banks in the euro area. One of these channels is
the level of rigor applied by the new institution. If, on the one hand, investors
expect harsher enforcement and interpretation of rules than the average of
previous national supervisors, bank profits should decrease. In essence, banks
face more restrictions, which can entail considerable private costs.2 On the
other hand, the opposite scenario can occur as well. In that case, the SSM
follows a more lenient approach, leading to an increase in bank profits.
However, the level of supervision might not only affect the cost side
of banks. In the presence of agency problems, shareholders could even
appreciate rigor. In case bank managers take decisions that are undesired by
investors (e.g. excessive risk), harsh external monitoring will improve bank
performance. Moreover, the SSM could exert an indirect impact on financial
institutions via positive spillover effects of good supervision. Again, profits
rise: Banks in country A could benefit from banks in country B that are less
prone to insolvency due to network effects. Therefore, the risk of contagion
is mitigated. All in all, there are multiple effects which can point in opposite
1This mechanism arises when risky banks hold a large amount of bonds of their
own indebted government. Bailout of banks leads to higher government debt. In turn,
government bonds and, therefore, bank assets become more risky. In this case, the default
risks of banks and governments mutually reinforce each other (Acharya et al. (2014),
for instance, propose a model). See also the Euro Area Summit statement on June 29,
2012, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/milestones/shared/pdf/
2012-06-29_euro_area_summit_statement_en.pdf.
2As an example, SSM officials could impose a more conservative portfolio on risky
European banks to shield other EU member states from high bailout payments. Formally,
the SSM can do so as it has the right to disallow certain bank operations, see also Section 2.
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directions. Their size, however, is not ex-ante clear.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether negative or positive
channels dominate. Using event study methodology, the paper investigates
the SSM’s impact on European banks’ profits. Given this setting, two
aspects are essential for the analysis. First, announcements that regard
the implementation of the SSM or revealed information about institutional
details are exploited. As long as investors did not foresee the introduction
of the SSM and there have been no other essential announcements on the
event day, SSM announcements can be utilized to achieve identification
of its impact. Second, this study uses stock returns as the measure of
interest. If investors’ expectations of the SSM are different from their
perceptions of national supervision, there should be an impact on stock
prices. Assuming rational investor behavior, these prices are a proxy for
future profits. Therefore, stock returns are suitable to analyze if bank business
(on average) is improved or hampered by the introduction of supranational
bank supervision.
As a first result, the event study finds evidence in favor of the hypotheses
that predict positive effects. This is accomplished by measuring the impact
on several event dates. The day that the SSM was announced (29.06.2012),
stock returns of banks increased significantly around 3.9 percentage points
on average. When a more detailed plan was released (12.09.2012), there was
another significant impact of around 2.5 percentage points. Hence, the overall
effect cumulates to about 6.4 percentage points.
The SSM replaces different national institutions, so it is likely that there is
heterogeneity in its impact. Analyzing this heterogeneity helps to distinguish
between the mechanisms stated above. Therefore, in a second step, the
sample is split into countries with high and low pre-SSM banking supervision.
Employing a permutation-based test reveals that the SSM had a higher
impact on less supervised banks. A split by the Corruption Perception Index
results in a higher positive impact of the SSM in countries where corruption
is perceived to be more intense. In the last split, countries with high and low
debt-to-GDP ratios are analyzed separately. The SSM had a higher impact
on banks in countries with higher indebtedness. In conclusion, the impact
was higher for banks in countries with weak institutions.
This second result is in line with the idea that the SSM is a remedy
to international contagion. It is also in line with the notion that stricter
supervision mitigates agency problems. It is less compatible with the idea
of laxer supervision. In that case, stock returns of loosely monitored banks
should have risen by less as they started from a lower level of supervision. As
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an additional result, the impact on banks in euro area countries is compared
to the impact on banks in European countries outside the eurozone. From
this procedure it can be concluded that the impact of the SSM remains
positive for both groups and was about 2 percentage points higher for euro
area banks.
The existing literature provides several arguments why the SSM should
influence bank profits, corresponding to the different channels introduced
above. A first strand of the literature examines how the level of supervision
is changed by harmonization. Theoretical work includes Morrison and
White (2009). They show that harmonization of regulation can lead to the
imposition of the weakest regulatory standards. On average, banks profit
from harmonization. Others have argued that harmonized supervision goes
hand in hand with strictness. This imposes costs on commercial banks and
leads to lower profitability. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), for instance,
show that harmonized regulation is only implemented when high standards
can be agreed upon. Acharya (2003) argues that risk spillovers among banks
force supervisory agencies in less forbearing regimes to increase their level
of forbearance. Joint harmonization of supervision and regulation inhibits
this race to the bottom. Agarwal et al. (2014) empirically find that a central
supervisor can be more strict, even when the same law applies. Analyzing US
banks, they show that, compared to state authorities, the federal supervisory
agency has a higher taste for downgrading supervisory ratings.
Second, bank supervision and regulation can alter the
shareholder-manager relationship of a bank. Positive effects on stock
prices arise if supranational supervision is able to solve principal-agent
issues. Conducting health checks and investigations, improved supervision
could reduce information asymmetries between CEOs and investors.
Myers and Majluf (1984) find that information asymmetry can result in
forgone profitable investment opportunities. Additionally, strong supervision
might protect shareholders from overconfident managers. Malmendier
and Tate (2005), for instance, find that overconfident CEOs can distort
investment. Empirically, it seems that shareholders of banks do not favor
too much risk. Houston and James (1995) show that bank CEOs receive
contracts that induce them to engage in less risk compared to other
CEO contracts. Saunders et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009)
find that owner-controlled banks usually engage in more risk than their
manager-controlled counterparts.
Lastly, positive effects of the SSM occur when international externalities
and spillover effects exist but are internalized by decisions of one harmonized
authority. If the SSM can stabilize risky banks, the lower probability of
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contagion affects the remaining network of banks in a positive way. Allen
and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004) and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2013) for instance, propose models with externalities via international
bank deposits across countries. Others like Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)
have argued that information spillovers can lead to financial contagion.
Empirically, Iyer and Peydró (2011) find that interbank linkages cause
financial contagion. Helwege and Zhang (2016) conclude from their results
that there is also scope for information contagion.
This paper also relates to the empirical literature on the effects of banking
supervision and regulation. Barth et al. (2004), for instance, examine the
efficiency of different regulatory and supervisory instruments. Petrella and
Resti (2013) perform an event study to test the impact of stress tests
on investor perceptions. These two papers evaluate the effects of certain
supervisory means and measures. This paper adds to the list of supervisory
features by assessing the effect of harmonization, in particular the case of the
SSM, on bank returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
briefly discusses the institutional background of the SSM and outlines the
events that are subject to this study. Section 3 provides details about the
data and the methodology that is applied in this paper to test for impacts of
events. Section 4 presents the results of the study, consisting of full sample
and sample split estimations. Section 5 discusses these results and then
concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Events
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is an institution of the European
Central Bank (ECB) that is dedicated to the task of supervising large banks.
As of January 2016, it supervised 129 out of roughly 6000 banks in the
euro area. The rest of the banks remained under the supervision of national
authorities. This fraction of SSM-supervised banks might seem surprisingly
small at first glance. However, it accounts for over 80% of total assets of
all euro area banks. Several criteria are employed to decide which banks fall
under ECB supervision. In this regard, fulfilling a single criterion is sufficient
in order to be assigned to the SSM. First of all, total assets of a bank
must exceed AC30 bn. Second, the bank has to be considered economically
important for the specific country or the European economy as a whole.
Third, total assets must exceed AC5 bn and cross-border activities in two
or more euro countries need to be more than 20% of total assets. Fourth,
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the bank must have received or requested funds from the European Stability
Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility. Lastly, the ECB can
classify (and therefore supervise) a bank as significant at its own discretion.
In short, the SSM captures large and systemically relevant banks of the euro
area.
The main purpose of the SSM is to establish stability in the European
financial sector and ensure compliance with existing EU banking regulation,
thereby harmonizing corrective measures, i.e. its decisions should be in the
interest of the entire European community. In an economic sense, this means
taking into account spillovers and externalities on countries other than the
bank’s host nation. For that purpose, the SSM conducts “health checks” on
banks that consist of asset assessment and stress tests, which are carried out
regularly as well as on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the SSM can interfere
in a bank’s business structure (e.g. by enforcing higher capital buffers or
prohibiting certain operations) and has the authority to impose fines in case
of non-compliance. Lastly, the SSM can also directly carry out investigations
and grant or withdraw bank licenses. In order to cover its costs, the SSM
charges fees directly from banks.3
Before investigating the results of this study, the history of origins of
the SSM helps identifying all major events. The first person to express
the idea of centralizing European banking supervision was Mario Draghi,
president of the ECB. In April 2012 he claimed that “During the crisis, we
have observed strong negative spillover effects across euro area countries and
between the banking sector and its respective sovereign. National supervisors
and Treasuries are also confronted with the well-known problem that during
good times, large banks work as European institutions but in bad times fall on
national shoulders. Ensuring a well-functioning EMU implies strengthening
banking supervision and resolution at European level.”4 However, this
merely seemed to be an isolated remark in a speech that mainly dealt
with the economic development in the euro area and the ECB’s recent
measures. The remark contained neither plans of politicians in charge nor
institutional details. The first event to indicate that a single supervision
authority was actually planned was the Euro Area Summit on June 29,
2012. In its corresponding statement, the European Council declared that
“We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks





The statement also contains an agreement to extend competences of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM is an institution that is
financed by the states of the euro area. It can provide funds to eurozone
governments in case of financial distress. During the Euro Area Summit, it
was decided that the ESM will be authorized to recapitalize banks directly
once the SSM is in place. This may have increased the bailout probabilities
of a few individual banks. In that case, the effect of the announcement of the
SSM is slightly confounded. Yet, the SSM is a severe regulatory intervention
and should affect all large banks in the euro area. Its announcement can
therefore be regarded as the most important part of the Euro Area Summit
statement with respect to bank returns.
Following the Summit, the proposal for the SSM was presented to the
public on September 12, 2012. At that time the SSM was supposed to cover
all euro area banks, as stated in the proposal: “Under the single supervisory
mechanism, the ECB will become responsible for supervising all banks within
the banking union [...]”.6 These two events seem decisive when it comes
to their information content. The first shows the determination of the EU
Council to implement harmonized supervision, the second provides details.
On December 13, 2012, the European Finance Ministers decided to
limit the scope of the SSM to systemically relevant banks and agree
upon the aforementioned classification criteria.7 This agreement, however,
was anticipated to some extent as a conflict between German and French
politicians on that issue preceded the event.8 Some months later, on
September 12, 2013, the European Parliament approved the proposals and
the EU Council adopted SSM regulations on October 15, 2013. About a year
later, on the 4th of September 2014, the ECB published a list of banks to be
supervised in the beginning. Ultimately, the SSM commenced its operations
on the 4th of November 2014.9
For the remaining analysis, it is crucial to determine the events that




7That way, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was able to keep the network
of local savings banks (“Sparkassen”), which provides service to most of the German retail
customers, under national supervision. See http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/12/13/
1307482/the-sticks-and-carrots-of-a-banking-union.
8See https://euobserver.com/economic/118415.

















Figure 1: Sequence of events
markets should react to. No impact is expected for Draghi’s statement
on the need for banking supervision at the European level. As indicated
above, this comment seemed rather vague and did not contain any specific
plans. Moreover, the day that the SSM was adopted and the day that the
SSM started operations do not come as a surprise. All issues regarding
the implementation should have been settled already. Therefore, these three
events are not analyzed any further.
The dates that appear relevant for financial markets include the
announcement that there will be a proposal (June 29, 2012), the presentation
of the proposal for a single supervisory mechanism (September 12, 2012)
and the decision that only large banks are subject to ECB supervision
(December 13, 2012). These events seem to contain most information content.
Specifically, the announcement at the Euro Area Summit on June 29, 2012
should have come as a surprise as, except for Draghi’s unspecific statement,
no plans in that direction had been mentioned before. Presentation of the
proposal itself could contain unexpected details. The element of surprise
in the large banks announcement stems from the fact that plans were
different before this day. Despite some anticipation, the outcome of the
negotiations were uncertain. Furthermore, approval of the proposal by the
European Parliament (September 12, 2013) appears interesting as well, as
it became more certain that the proposal will in fact be implemented.
Figure 1 summarizes all events in a timeline. Bold events contain important
information for financial markets. These four specific days are therefore
expected to have an impact on stock prices and are subject to the remaining
analysis.
3 Data and Event Study Methodology
This study tests whether the introduction of the SSM had an impact
on stock prices of listed banks in the euro area. The financial data that
are required for this kind of analysis are provided by Thompson Reuters
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Datastream. The sample consists of 88 euro area banks10 and their stock
prices over the period from January 2, 2012 to January 1, 2015. In the last
step of the analysis, the remaining banks in Europe, i.e. in countries with
different currencies, are compared to euro banks. Thus, the sample increases
to 249 observations. Furthermore, the stock market data are merged with
country-specific indicators for corruption (Corruption Perception Index of
2012, CPI11) and supervisory power (Supervisory Power Index of 2011, Barth
et al. (2013)12) as well as debt-to-GDP ratios for the year 2012 (International
Monetary Fund13). Section 4.2 further discusses these indices.
In the analysis, I follow the literature on event studies for financial data
(see for instance Krüger, 2015, Nygaard, 2011). This approach consists of
several steps. First of all, abnormal returns need to be calculated. They are
the measure of interest because each asset’s correlation with the market is
removed. In this way, an individual share’s reaction to the market can be
separated from its reaction to the event. In more detail, abnormal returns
for one bank are obtained by regressing its ordinary returns on the returns of
the Euro Stoxx 50 (representation of the market) in the pre-event period, the
so called estimation period.14 Residuals of this regression are then predicted
for the event period, i.e. the time frame in which the events occur. These
residuals constitute abnormal returns, i.e what remains are returns without
the component that is explained by the market. This procedure is conducted
for each bank separately.
Furthermore, the possibility that there is information overflow15 before
the event or underreaction16 afterwards needs to be taken into account. For
this purpose, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are computed. They are
obtained by aggregating abnormal returns in a time frame around the event.
If the event day is defined as t = 0, then the 5-day window CAR is the sum
of abnormal returns from t = −5, ..., 0, ...,+5. In this study, results for 5-,
3- and 1-day windows are reported. Furthermore, the 0-day window, i.e. the
10Two banks (BANIF and Liberbank) had their IPO later than September 26, 2012,




14In this case, the pre-event period is the time before the first major event (June 29,
2012). The regression should not include observations on any event day associated with
the SSM. Furthermore, the five days before the event are also excluded because they enter
the cumulative abnormal return. In the end, the estimation period is chosen to have a
length of 120 pre-SSM days.
15Stock prices can react before an event, for instance due to insider information.
16Reaction to the event can be can be a process that takes more than one day.
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abnormal return on the day of the event, is subject to all testing procedures.
Subsequently, it is tested whether the (cumulative) abnormal return on
the event day differs statistically from 0 to analyze if the event had an impact.
This is done for all major event days identified in Section 2. Three different
testing procedures are employed. First of all, a simple cross-sectional t-test
on the mean of all CARs on the event day is performed. The results from
this test serve as a benchmark case.
Secondly, a test developed by Boehmer et al. (1991) is employed. This
test is robust to so-called event-induced variance, i.e. when the event itself
changes the variance of the distribution of stock returns. Compared to the
t-test, the Boehmer test should be more conservative when the event increases
the variance. Furthermore, the authors show that event-date clustering does
not affect rejection rates of their test in simulations. Event-date clustering
arises when the event occurs on the same day for all banks, as is the case in
this analysis.
For the third procedure, a nonparametric rank test proposed by Kolari
and Pynnonen (2011) is applied. The advantage of this test is that it
does not rely on any distributional assumptions. It can handle correlation
among bank returns, i.e. stock prices of different banks do not have to be
independent of each other. Moreover, simulations show that the test is robust
towards cross-sectional and serial correlation in abnormal returns, event-date
clustering as well as event-induced variance. It thus seems that the test of
Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) is more robust towards misspecification than
the other procedures.17 If there is a high positive correlation among bank
returns, this test should be more conservative than the others.
In a final step, it is investigated whether the impact of the SSM differed
for banks in different countries. The sample is therefore split by median
Supervisory Power Index (SPI), Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and
Debt/GDP, one split at a time. Again, the impact of the SSM is computed
and analyzed by all three testing procedures. This time, however, each test is
applied separately for banks in countries with high and low values of the split
variable. In order to compare the impacts of the SSM on the high and the low
group, a permutation-based test is performed. For that purpose, a dummy
variable that indicates the group to which a bank belongs is generated. This
variable is permuted among all banks and a new pseudo-sample is created.
Next, the difference of impacts between both groups in the pseudo-sample is
17Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) propose two different versions of their test named
GRANK-T and GRANK-Z. I employ the GRANK-T test as the authors show that it
is more robust to event-date clustering.
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measured. The process is repeated 100,000 times. In doing so, a large amount
of impact differences is generated. The newly obtained distribution of impacts
is valid under the null hypothesis that the group-dummy is exchangeable
among observations and can therefore be permuted. This assumption also
implies that the impact on both groups is the same. The original impact
difference can now be compared to the distribution of generated impact
differences in order to test whether it differs statistically from 0. The last
part of the analysis applies the same strategy but compares euro area to
non-euro area European banks.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Full Sample
The impact evaluation strategy discussed in Section 3 is applied to the subset
of events discussed in Section 2 (Euro Area Summit, Presentation of Proposal,
“Large Banks Only” Announcement, Approval of Proposal).
Figure 2 depicts the path of the average abnormal return around these
events by plotting a time series line of 51 days. As can already be inferred
from the graph, there are large positive spikes on the first two event days.
The larger of both effects occurs on the 29th of June 2012. The decision
to harmonize supervision seemed to have positively surprised investors.
Revealing a more detailed proposal (September 12, 2012) yields a smaller
effect. Therefore, the decision to implement the SSM can be regarded as
the main event. Adding details seems less important than the main idea of
establishing the SSM. It is possible that the European Council did not include
major unforeseen aspects in the proposal. The impact on the day of approval
by the European Parliament seems rather negligible. This graphical result
is confirmed by the empirical tests discussed in Section 3.18 The impact on
September 12, 2013 appears to be close to 0 for the pooled sample as well.
The information content of this event day, however, differs between banks.
Contrary to prior information, only larger banks fall under the supervision
of the SSM. Therefore, the impact will be analyzed for supervised and
non-supervised banks separately.
As indicated by visual inspection, a more detailed analysis seems
appropriate for the first two events. Table I summarizes the estimated impact
of these event days for return windows of size 5, 3, 1 and 0. Moreover, the




























































































































Figure 2: Mean abnormal returns of all banks in the euro area for different
event days
impact of the event on the 12th of September 2013 is differentiated between
banks and also included in Table I. In contrast, the impact on the 13th of
December 2012 seems less significant and results are therefore deferred to the
Appendix in Table A1. Overall, the results confirm the intuition provided by
Figure 2. Announcing the proposal did have a significant impact. The effect
of the proposal itself is smaller and less significant. Deciding that the SSM
will only supervise large banks leads to small and insignificant impacts for
both groups of banks.
Furthermore, examining the significance levels of all tests in Table I
helps to get an impression of the econometric properties of the data. The
Boehmer test yields results very similar to the common t-test, indicating that
event-date clustering and event-induced variance are negligible issues. Kolari
results are either equally or less significant than the other tests for most of
the table. It therefore seems that there is correlation among bank returns.
For that reason, the most robust and conservative Kolari test provides the
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Table I: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Panel A: 29.06.2012 Euro Area Summit
Mean CAR -0.0191 0.0318 0.0343 0.0386
SE t-test 0.0116 0.0129** 0.0076*** 0.0050***
z-score Boehmer 0.6433 3.9248*** 6.2002*** 8.7389***
t Kolari -1.6040 1.1104 2.2525** 2.3545**
Observations 88 88 88 88
Panel B: 12.09.2012 Presentation of Proposal
Mean CAR 0.0788 0.0614 0.0199 0.0249
SE t-test 0.0130*** 0.0101*** 0.0065*** 0.0052***
z-score Boehmer 7.7437*** 6.8891*** 2.6613*** 5.2830***
t Kolari 2.5965** 2.2833** 0.7372 1.6891*
Observations 88 88 88 88
Panel C: 13.12.2012 Large Banks
C1: All Banks
Mean CAR 0.0156 0.0071 0.0106 0.0013
SE t-test 0.0097 0.0083 0.0043** 0.0041
z-score Boehmer 1.8366* 1.1753 1.9668** 0.4339
t Kolari 0.3057 0.6732 0.3550 -0.2867
Observations 88 88 88 88
C2: Supervised Banks
Mean CAR 0.0200 0.0111 0.0102 0.0061
SE t-test 0.0129 0.0116 0.0053* 0.0059
z-score Boehmer 1.4248 1.0505 1.4340 0.6049
t Kolari 0.9159 0.5257 0.9195 0.1624
Observations 57 57 57 57
C3: Non-Supervised Banks
Mean CAR 0.0075 -0.0002 0.0112 -0.0077
SE t-test 0.0142 0.0101 0.0076 0.0038*
z-score Boehmer 1.3426 0.5250 1.3880 1.9080*
t Kolari 1.1542 1.2759 0.7830 -2.3056**
Observations 31 31 31 31
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero for different event days
and window sizes. Standard errors are reported in three different ways to account for event-date
clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer et. al (1991), Kolari and Pynnonen
(2011)). Panel C is split into supervised and non-supervised banks as ECB supervision of large
banks only was announced on that day. Stars indicate significance levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%).
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results of interest for inference.
Inspecting Panel A reveals that announcing the proposal had a positive
effect of 3.86 percentage points for the 0-day window, which is the preferred
size, assuming no information overflow before the event and underreaction
of stock prices afterwards. This impact is significant at the 5% level by
the Kolari test. Moreover, the effect turns insignificant for larger windows,
suggesting that there is not too much over- and undershooting of stock prices.
Panel B indicates that there were some positive effects on September
12, 2012. The estimate of the 0-day impact is 2.49 percentage points,
which is assigned a significance level of 10% by the Kolari test. This leaves
the impression of mild positive effects. Possibly, presenting details about
the SSM led to convergence of perceptions towards a positive impact.
Alternatively, these details may have added more certainty to the entire
process. It is conceivable that purpose and function of the SSM were clear
upon announcement already and the proposal merely confirmed perceptions.
Panel C shows results for the “large banks only” announcement. Impact
values are positive but close to 0 and therefore mostly insignificant, i.e. there
seems to have been no impact. Splitting the sample into banks that later
turned out to be supervised by the ECB (C2) and those that did not (C3)
does not alter these results substantially. The only exception is a small
negative effect, for non-supervised banks of -0.77 percentage points at the
0-day window, which is significant at the 5% level. This is in line with
the argument that there should be no additional information content for
supervised banks. For smaller banks, the expectation should have changed
from ECB to national supervision. However, small banks do not appear to
have expected big changes in supervision. The aforementioned negative effect
of -0.77 percentage points seems economically relatively small. Furthermore,
the weak effects can also be the result of anticipation, as discussed in
Section 2.
All in all, Table I indicates that investors perceived the introduction of
the SSM (June 29, 2012) as a positive event. Its impact on bank stocks is
estimated to amount to roughly 3.9 percentage points upon announcement.
Presentation of details yields smaller effects of around 2.5 percentage points
and announcing that only large banks will be supervised did not have an
impact. This is in line with expectations. Investors can assess the effect of the
SSM when it is announced and their appraisal will be reflected in stock prices
immediately. If no particularly unexpected detail about the implementation
of the SSM is added, a more specific proposal should not have a large effect.
Therefore, the intuition that June 29, 2012 is the most important event day
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is confirmed.
A natural extension of the analysis would be to run these tests for all
European countries separately in order to investigate how their national
supervisory authorities are perceived compared to the SSM. However, this
is not feasible due to the limited sample size. Instead, the sample is split
into two parts (above and below the median of the respective split variable)
by three different variables. First of all, the Supervisory Power Index
(SPI) is employed. This index is constructed from survey data, which are
collected from banking supervision and regulation authorities. The SPI is
the sum of a certain set of legal rights that are granted to these authorities.
The second split variable is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The
CPI is published by Transparency International and compiled from the
views of experts, business people and analysts. Corruption and supervisory
power seem reasonable factors in determining the quality of a supervising
institution. Splitting the sample along those dimensions should capture some
of the heterogeneity in pre-SSM institutions. Furthermore, the sample is split
by Debt/GDP, as banks typically own some amount of government bonds of
their home country. Slack regulation might result in reduced interest rates, so
more government debt could lead to fewer supervisory incentives. The SSM
should be an independent institution that eliminates these incentives and
establishes more trust in banks. That should be reflected in a higher impact
for high Debt/GDP countries. In order to make sure that the sample splits
are not too similar to each other and all estimations are essentially identical,
the correlation among these indices for euro area countries is measured. The
correlation between SPI and CPI is -0.3021, it is -0.1645 between SPI and
Debt/GDP and -0.3535 between CPI and Debt/GDP. All of these values
seem reasonably distant from 1/-1 in order to justify using all of them for
a sample split. For more details, a list of the values of all split variables for
euro countries can be found in the Appendix in Table A2.
4.2 Sample Split
Due to the fact that the variables which determine the split were not
randomly allocated before the introduction of the SSM, differences in the
effects have to be interpreted in a rather descriptive manner. If, for example,
the sample is split by SPI, high SPI countries can have an effect different from
low SPI countries due to other (omitted) variables that correlate with SPI,
i.e. causality cannot be established.19 In order not to rely on distributional
19For example, when large and powerful banks are rather located in low-SPI countries,
the difference in the effect of the SSM can also be caused by differences in the size or
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Table II: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns. Sample
split by Supervisory Power Index
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Panel A: 29.06.2012 Euro Area Summit
A1: Supervision greater or equal median
Mean CAR -0.0226 0.0280 0.0294 0.0309
SE t-test 0.0164 0.0190 0.0102*** 0.0059***
z-score Boehmer 0.5021 2.3142** 3.5361*** 5.7611***
t Kolari -2.0509** 0.6754 1.5470 1.8971*
Observations 56 56 56 56
A2: Supervision less than median
Mean CAR -0.0130 0.0385 0.0431 0.0520
SE t-test 0.0139 0.0126*** 0.0111*** 0.0086***
z-score Boehmer 1.9984** 3.8037*** 6.1504*** 7.2120***
t Kolari -0.9290 1.5858 3.0446*** 2.7517***
Observations 32 32 32 32
A3: Permutation test
p-value 0.7217 0.7292 0.4295 0.0603*
Panel B: 12.09.2012 Presentation of Proposal
B1: Supervision greater or equal median
Mean CAR 0.0620 0.0454 0.0110 0.0161
SE t-test 0.0173*** 0.0124*** 0.0071 0.0035***
z-score Boehmer 4.8300*** 4.2177*** 1.1124 4.2265***
t Kolari 2.0834** 1.7252* 0.1803 1.5498
Observations 56 56 56 56
B2: Supervision less than median
Mean CAR 0.1081 0.0894 0.0353 0.0402
SE t-test 0.0185*** 0.0162*** 0.0127*** 0.0125***
z-score Boehmer 6.9661*** 6.0966*** 2.8222*** 3.6329***
t Kolari 2.9466*** 2.6888*** 1.3440 1.7192*
Observations 32 32 32 32
B3: Permutation test
p-value 0.1164 0.0508* 0.0962* 0.0340**
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero for different event days
and window sizes. Standard errors are reported in three different ways to account for event-date
clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer et. al (1991), Kolari and Pynnonen
(2011)). All Panels are split by the median (with respect to Euro-countries) of the Supervision
Power Index (Barth et al., 2013). Banks in countries with above-median supervision are in Panel
1 and in Panel 2 for below-median supervision. Panel 3 contains results of a permutation-based
test for differences between the mean impacts (100,000 replications) displayed in Panel 1 and
Panel 2. Stars indicate significance levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%).
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assumptions, a permutation-based test is performed on the effect difference
to check if it can be statistically distinguished from 0. This test permutes a
dummy that indicates whether a bank is above or below the split threshold
and then calculates the mean impact of the SSM for both subsamples as well
as the difference thereof. Repeating that several times yields the distribution
of the effect difference under the hypothesis that the dummy is exchangeable
and inference can be drawn.
Split by Supervisory Power
Table II shows results when splitting the sample by the median of SPI, which
amounts to 11. For the purpose of parsimony, only results of the two most
significant dates (June 29, 2012 and September 12, 2012) are reported. The
effects on December 13, 2012 in Table I are rather small and insignificant.
Therefore, the event seems irrelevant and it is dropped from any further
analysis. First of all, it can be inferred from the table that the impact remains
positive for both types of banks. Secondly, the impact of the SSM is higher
for banks in regimes with low supervisory power. Both observations hold for
both event days.
In more detail, Panel A deals with June 29, 2012. Panel A1 shows mean
CARs for banks in countries that have an SPI greater or equal to median SPI.
In the 0-day window, there is an impact of 3.09 percentage points, which is
found to be significant at the 10% level by the Kolari test. Panel A2 mirrors
Panel A1 for banks with low SPI. Here, the effect becomes significant at the
1% level and amounts to 5.2 percentage points. The difference between effects
of Panel A1 and A2 is presented in A3 by performing the permutation test.
Here, the 0-day window is significant at the 10% level. All in all, Panel A
suggests that the positive effect of the Euro Area Summit on bank returns
was primarily driven by banks in low supervision countries.
The same procedure is repeated for the 12th of September 2012. Here, the
effect of closely monitored banks (Panel B1) is 1.16 percentage points and
insignificant for the 0-day window. Higher effects can be observed for banks in
regimes with low SPI (Panel B2). Here, the 0-day window impact amounts
to 4.02 percentage points, which is significant at the 10% level according
to the Kolari test. Furthermore, results of the permutation test (Panel B3)
indicate that the impacts are significantly different for banks in low and




























Mean of abnormal return, SPI < 11
Mean of abnormal return, SPI ≥ 11
Figure 3: Mean abnormal returns of listed banks in the euro area split by
median Supervision Power Index (SPI)
emerges. Effects are mostly positive and higher for banks in countries with
low supervision. Figure 3 displays these results graphically.
All in all, the findings from Table II support the excessive risk hypothesis.
It is possible that investors expected that the SSM prohibits bank CEOs from
exposing the bank’s balance sheet to exceedingly volatile assets. The higher
effects for countries with low SPI further support this idea. Weakly legally
backed supervisors could face difficulties when trying to reorganize the risk
structure of a bank. So from an investor’s point of view, the SSM seems to
have resulted in some improvement, even more so for banks in countries that
had a low power of supervision prior to the SSM.
Split by Corruption Perception
The SPI is a measure of legal rights. It incorporates neither enforcement
of those rights nor compliance with the law. In the next step, the previous
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Table III: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns.
Sample split by Corruption Perception Index
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Panel A: 29.06.2012 Euro Area Summit
A1: CPI greater or equal median
Mean CAR -0.0006 0.0321 0.0329 0.0261
SE t-test 0.0199 0.0233 0.0127** 0.0064***
z-score Boehmer 1.7415* 2.7388*** 3.9137*** 5.3044***
t Kolari -0.3063 0.4751 1.5652 1.9081*
Observations 44 44 44 44
A2: CPI less than median
Mean CAR -0.0376 0.0315 0.0358 0.0511
SE t-test 0.0114*** 0.0113*** 0.0086*** 0.0072***
z-score Boehmer -1.2034 2.8493*** 5.0176*** 7.1296***
t Kolari 2.5731** 1.5601 2.5846** 2.4428**
Observations 44 44 44 44
A3: Permutation test
p-value 0.1086 0.9840 0.8529 0.0124**
Panel B: 12.09.2012 Presentation of Proposal
B1: CPI greater or equal median
Mean CAR 0.0711 0.0534 0.0116 0.0134
SE t-test 0.0192*** 0.0132*** 0.0078 0.0041***
z-score Boehmer 6.2589*** 5.9106*** 1.7624* 3.2454***
t Kolari 3.2157*** 3.0895*** 0.8269 1.3701
Observations 44 44 44 44
B2: CPI less than median
Mean CAR 0.0865 0.0693 0.0282 0.0364
SE t-test 0.0178*** 0.0152*** 0.0104*** 0.0093***
z-score Boehmer 4.6756*** 3.8997*** 1.9860** 4.2263***
t Kolari 1.8907* 1.4293 0.5647 1.6332
Observations 44 44 44 44
B3: Permutation test
p-value 0.5647 0.4359 0.2125 0.0225**
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero for different event days
and window sizes. Standard errors are reported in three different ways to account for event-date
clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer et. al (1991), Kolari and Pynnonen
(2011)). All Panels are split by the median (with respect to Euro-countries) of the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI, Barth et al., 2013). Banks in countries with above-median corruption are
in Panel 1 and in Panel 2 for below-median corruption. This index is constructed in a way that a
high CPI is associated with low perceived corruption. Panel 3 contains a permutation-based test
for differences between the impacts displayed in Panel 1 and Panel 2. Stars indicate significance
levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%).
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estimation procedure is repeated with corruption to capture heterogeneity in
pre-SSM institutions along that dimension. The sample is split by median
CPI (65.5) in Table III. It is important to note that high corruption
perception corresponds to a low CPI value and vice versa. Hence, the split
in Table III has to be interpreted accordingly: Countries with CPI greater or
equal than median exhibit rather low corruption perception. Again, positive
effects can be sustained, regardless of regime and event day. Furthermore,
the impact of the SSM is slightly higher for banks in countries with higher
perceived corruption.
More explicitly, Panel A displays results for June 29, 2012. The impact
amounts to 2.61 percentage points for the low corruption countries in Panel
A1. The Kolari test rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level. The
impact in high corruption countries in Panel A2 is almost twice as large
(5.11 percentage points) and significant at the 5% level. Performing the
permutation test for the difference between Panel A1 and A2 reveals that
the two groups are differently affected by the SSM at the 5% significance
level for the 0-day window.
Panel B inspects impacts on the 12th of September 2012. The effect size
for the 0-day window is an insignificant 1.34 percentage points for banks in
low corruption countries (B1). Banks in high corruption countries in Panel
B2 experienced an insignificant impact of 3.64 percentage points. Again, the
permutation test is performed and yields the same result as in Panel A: There
are significant differences for the 0-day window at the 5% level. The results
of Table III point in the same direction as the results of Table II: Effects are
mostly positive and larger for banks in countries where corruption is more
prevalent. Thus, there seems to be some evidence that the SSM had a bigger
impact on banks in countries with higher corruption perception. Investors
might put more trust in the European institution. Graphically, the impacts
look similar to Figure 3 and can be found in the Appendix in Figure A1.
Split by Debt/GDP
In the last step, the same analysis is performed for the median of the
debt-to-GDP ratio (80.5) of all euro area countries. The results are displayed
in Table IV. The table indicates that the effect of the SSM on banks
in countries with low indebtedness is negligible. In contrast, financial
institutions in countries with high government debt mostly contribute to
the positive effects of Table I. Again, Panel A addresses the 29th of June
2012. The effect size for banks in highly indebted countries (A1) amounts
to 5.29 percentage points. The Kolari test can sustain a significance level of
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Table IV: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns.
Sample split by debt-to-GDP ratio
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Panel A: 29.06.2012 Euro Area Summit
A1: Debt/GDP greater or equal median
Mean CAR -0.0113 0.0581 0.0567 0.0529
SE t-test 0.0151 0.0165*** 0.0089*** 0.0059***
z-score Boehmer 1.3402 4.6907*** 9.0333*** 10.1930***
t Kolari -0.8393 1.6891* 2.6430*** 2.4727**
Observations 60 60 60 60
A2: Debt/GDP less than median
Mean CAR -0.0351 -0.0244 -0.0135 0.0078
SE t-test 0.0166** 0.0154 0.0097 0.0060
z-score Boehmer -1.6631* -0.6477 -0.8173 1.8319*
t Kolari -4.5567*** -2.2590** -0.5095 0.6447
Observations 28 28 28 28
A3: Permutation test
p-value 0.5342 0.0894* 0.0161** 0.0161**
Panel B: 12.09.2012 Presentation of Proposal
B1: Debt/GDP greater or equal median
Mean CAR 0.1025 0.0768 0.0277 0.0301
SE t-test 0.0125*** 0.0107*** 0.0078*** 0.0070***
z-score Boehmer 9.2120*** 7.2995*** 3.0204*** 5.1611***
t Kolari 2.7564*** 2.4891** 1.1322 1.8024*
Observations 60 60 60 60
B2: Debt/GDP less than median
Mean CAR 0.0281 0.0284 0.0031 0.0139
SE t-test 0.0293 0.0206 0.0115 0.0058**
z-score Boehmer 1.8880* 2.0424** 0.2098 1.6951*
t Kolari 0.8774 0.3957 -1.6286 0.0293
Observations 28 28 28 28
B3: Permutation test
p-value 0.1271 0.1975 0.3084 0.3972
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero for different event days
and window sizes. Standard errors are reported in three different ways to account for event-date
clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer et. al (1991), Kolari and Pynnonen
(2011)). All Panels are split by the median (with respect to Euro-countries) of Debt/GDP. Banks
in countries with above-median Debt/GDP are in Panel 1 and in Panel 2 for below-median
Debt/GDP. Panel 3 contains a permutation-based test for differences between the impacts
displayed in Panel 1 and Panel 2. Stars indicate significance levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%).
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5%. For banks in less indebted countries (A2), the effect is rather low (0.78
percentage points) and insignificant. Moreover, the permutation test (A3)
indicates that A1 and A2 are significantly different (5% level) for the 0-day
window.
For the 12th of September 2012 (Panel B), the impact in highly indebted
countries (B1) amounts to 3.01 percentage points for the 0-day window.
Employing the Kolari test, significance can be sustained at the 10% level.
In countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios (B2), the impact of the 0-day
window is 1.39 percentage points and insignificant. For the same window,
the permutation test cannot reject the hypothesis that both effects are
equal at conventional levels. Summarizing these results, Table IV gives the
overall impression that the positive effects are mainly driven by banks in
countries with high debt-over-GDP ratios. This speaks in favor of the idea
that governments with more debt have fewer incentives to supervise in a
strict manner. As domestic banks often hold a large amount of government
debt, less strict supervision might result in lower interest rates. A graph of
the impact can be found in the Appendix in Figure A2.
4.3 Euro vs. Non-Euro Banks
Resulting from spillover effects, it is possible that the SSM also has an impact
on non-euro area banks in Europe. While spillovers are possible for euro
area banks as well, the SSM should have a direct impact on these banks in
addition. Therefore, I add non-euro European banks to the dataset so that
it now contains the entirety of European listed banks. The sample is then
split between euro and non-euro countries. Under the restrictive assumption
that spillovers are the same for euro and non-euro banks (as well as the
assumption that there were no other shocks on non-euro banks on the event
day), the effects can be disentangled. If the assumption is not fulfilled, the
sample split shows in a descriptive manner whether these two groups of banks
were affected differently. Table V contains the results of the split with the
extended sample.
As can be concluded from the table, there is also a positive and significant
impact on non-euro banks. This effect is considerably smaller than the
effect on euro banks. Hence, it seems that the direct impact is stronger
than spillover effects. Taking a closer look at the 29th of June 2012, there
was an impact on non-euro banks of 1.60 percentage points for the 0-day
window, significant at the 1% level by the Kolari test. This number is
compared to the impact on euro banks in Table I (3.86 percentage points).
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Table V: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns. Euro
vs. non-euro European banks
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Panel A: 29.06.2012 Euro Area Summit
A1: Mean impact on non-euro banks
Mean CAR 0.0101 0.0195 0.0189 0.0160
SE t-test 0.0052* 0.0056*** 0.0037*** 0.0027***
z-score Boehmer 4.7228*** 6.7747*** 6.2582*** 8.3939***
t Kolari 0.8879 2.1116** 2.5483** 2.6829***
Observations 161 161 161 161
A2: Permutation test
Difference euro vs non-euro
Difference of mean impacts -0.0292 0.0123 0.0154 0.0226
p-value 0.0075 0.3175 0.0426** 0.0000***
Panel B: 12.09.2012 Presentation of Proposal
B1: Mean impact on non-euro banks
Mean CAR 0.0280 0.0250 0.0070 0.0050
SE t-test 0.0052*** 0.0042*** 0.0026*** 0.0014***
z-score Boehmer 7.0463*** 7.4690*** 1.9070* 4.3061***
t Kolari 1.9264* 2.2493** -0.0257 1.7326*
Observations 161 161 161 161
B2: Permutation test
Difference euro vs non-euro
Difference of mean impacts 0.0508 0.0363 0.0128 0.0199
p-value 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0315** 0.0000***
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero for different event days and
window sizes for European banks that are not part of the euro area. Standard errors are reported in
three different ways to account for event-date clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer
et. al (1991), Kolari and Pynnonen (2011)). Panel 2 contains a permutation-based test for differences
between the impact of the SSM on euro area banks displayed in Table I and the impacts displayed in
Panel 1. Stars indicate significance levels (*10%, **5%, ***1%).
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The permutation-based test can sustain a significance level of 1% for the
difference of impacts. A similar picture arises for the 12th of September 2012.
Again, the impact on non-euro banks is positive but close to 0 for the 0-day
window. The difference between euro and non-euro countries now amounts
to 1.99 percentage points. Like the difference in Panel A1, it is significant at
the 1% level. In line with expectations, these results indicate that the SSM
had a higher effect on euro banks on that event day, as well. Figure A3 in
the Appendix shows these results graphically.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated whether the SSM changed investor
perceptions about bank profitability. Overall, the empirical results provide
a uniform picture. Pooling all banks, announcing the SSM had a positive
impact on stock returns of banks in euro area countries. The same applies
to the presentation of a more detailed proposal. Splitting the sample by
various country-specific measures (SPI, CPI, Debt/GDP) reveals that the
positive effect of the SSM on abnormal returns is more pronounced for banks
that are located in institutionally weaker countries. Lastly, comparing euro to
non-euro European banks results in stronger effects for euro banks. Still, there
is a small positive impact on non-euro banks. All results represent averages.
Therefore, I cannot conclude that the SSM did not have any negative effects.
I can, however, infer that positive aspects outweigh.
For these reasons, the findings of this event study are consistent with
the hypothesis that the SSM prevents banks from taking excessive risks and
stabilizes them. In particular, the fact that the impact is found to be more
pronounced in countries with weaker institutions points in that direction.
When banks in these countries can be considered ex ante as less stable,
the SSM could be able to increase stability more than in other countries.
Moreover, the positive effects for non-euro area banks support the spillover
hypothesis. Both ideas are not mutually exclusive. Instead, it is conceivable
that less excessive risk of one bank also decreases bankruptcy probabilities of
other financial institutions due to network effects. My results indicate that
these spillover effects are smaller in size on average than direct effects.
In contrast, the results are less in line with the idea that investors
expected a central European supervision authority to be laxer than the
average European predecessor. On the one hand, this hypothesis also predicts
positive effects on stock prices as investors expect banks to be able to act more
in their self-interest. On the other hand, inconsistencies arise when looking
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at the results from splitting the sample by SPI. If the positive average effect
of the SSM on bank profits was the result of a lax European supervisory
regime, a stronger positive impact should be observable in countries with
strict ex ante supervision. After all, these banks were already exposed to weak
supervisors before the regime change. Hence, compared to banks in countries
with high SPI values, ex ante supervision is closer to the new standard for
these types of banks. As a consequence, they should be less affected. Table II
demonstrates the opposite. Considering these arguments, it is most likely that
the SSM improved bank stability by increasing the standards of supervision.
All in all, this event study suggests that the introduction of the SSM
was regarded as positive by investors in European banks. When it comes
to welfare implications of the SSM, additional dimensions need to be taken
into account. In particular, this paper does not consider bank customers,
bank employees and tax payers. Analyzing government bond risk premia for
different countries, for example, could shed light on the effect of harmonized




Table A1: Impact of SSM announcements on stock returns on the
12th of September, 2013 (Approval of Proposal)
Window 5 days 3 days 1 day 0 days
Mean CAR 0.0277 0.0164 0.0031 0.0021
SE t-test 0.0130** 0.0070** 0.0040 0.0018
z-score Boehmer 1.9336** 1.9534** 1.4591 -0.3165
t Kolari 1.2894 1.0427 0.5425 -0.8795
Obervations 88 88 88 88
Notes: This table shows the results of tests for mean CAR equals zero on the 12.09.2013
for different window sizes. Standard errors are reported in three different ways to account
for event-date clustering and event-induced variance (t-test, Boehmer et. al (1991), Kolari
and Pynnonen (2011)). Panel C is split into supervised and non-supervised banks as ECB
supervision of large banks only was announced on that day. Stars indicate significance levels
(*10%, **5%, ***1%).
Table A2: Values of split variables
Country SPI CPI Debt/GDP1
Austria 12 69 81.540
Belgium 11 75 103.865
Cyprus 11 66 79.495
Finland 5 90 52.888
France 10 71 89.404
Germany 11 79 79.311
Greece 8 36 156.494
Ireland 6 69 120.242
Italy 13 42 123.142
Lithuania 11 54 39.818
Malta 12 57 67.638
Netherlands 11 84 66.106
Portugal 12 63 125.764
Slovakia 11 46 52.107
Slovenia 14 61 53.362
Spain 9 65 84.440




























Mean of abnormal return, CPI < 65.5
Mean of abnormal return, CPI ≥ 65.5
Figure A1: Mean abnormal returns of listed banks in the euro area split by
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Mean of abnormal return, banks not in euro area
Mean of abnormal return, banks in euro area
Figure A3: Mean abnormal returns of listed banks in the euro area and
European banks in non-euro countries
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Krüger, Philipp (2015). “Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth.”
Journal of Financial Economics 115(2): 304-329.
Laeven, Luc, and Ross Levine (2009). “Bank governance, regulation and risk
taking.” Journal of Financial Economics 93(2): 259-275.
Malmendier, Ulrike, and Geoffrey Tate (2005). “CEO overconfidence and
corporate investment.” The Journal of Finance 60(6): 2661-2700.
Morrison, Alan D., and Lucy White (2009). “Level playing fields in
international financial regulation.” The Journal of Finance 64(3):
1099-1142.
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984). “Corporate financing and
investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not
have.” Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-221.
Niepmann, Friederike, and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013). “Bank bailouts,
international linkages, and cooperation.” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 5(4): 270-305.
Nygaard, Knut (2011). “Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway.” NHH
Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 5/2011.
Petrella, Giovanni, and Andrea Resti (2013). “Supervisors as information
producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?” Journal of
Banking & Finance 37(12): 5406-5420.
Saunders, Anthony, Elizabeth Strock, and Nickolaos G. Travlos (1990).
“Ownership structure, deregulation, and bank risk taking.” The Journal
of Finance 45(2): 643-654.
30
